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Property rights in financial 
transactions
by Alastair Hudson
Alastair Hudson analyses recent House of Lords' decisions in 
interest rate swaps cases and suggests new ways in which the 
principles of equity might be applied to solve the problems which
arise.
The prevention of systemic failure of financial markets 
depends in large part on the ability of market participants to 
have legal recourse to property which has been dealt in and to 
amounts owed to them. Recent House of Lords' decisions 
affecting interest rate swaps have attracted a huge academic 
commentary on their impact on principles of common law, 
equity and restitution. However their dire impact on financial 
markets has not been fully appreciated. The courts have 
assumed that standard market contracts will be completely 
ineffective for risk management purposes where their economic 
terms have been held to be void.
There are two primary considerations for lawyers creating 
financial market transactions: the ability to set-oft on insolvency 
of the counterparty and the general efficacy of termination 
provisions in standard form market contracts. This article 
considers the growth of recent case-law on this latter area and 
the impact of recent House ot Lords' decisions on the efficacy 
of financial contracts. Of particular interest is the impact of the 
swaps cases Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington [1996] AC 669 
and Kleinwort Benson v Glasgow City Council [1997] 4 ALR 641 on 
the contractual and restitutionary effect of void contracts.
It is not suggested here that the decisions on the facts in the
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swaps cases were wrong. Rather that the principles upon which 
those decisions were reached have far-reaching implications 
which would be better avoided. The standard market contracts, 
considered below, are not adequate to rebut the conclusions of 
the English courts on their facts. Consequently, it is suggested 
that there are different principles which ought to be applied by 
equity, in the context of commercial transactions, to achieve the 
desirable result of systemic risk management and greater 
commercial certainty.
AVAILABILITY OF PROPRIETARY REMEDIES
The central contention of this article is that the result of the 
majority decisions in the House of Lords in the swaps cases is 
that it impossible for parties to retain a proprietary interest in 
property transferred under a commercial contract which is 
found to be void ab initio. The restatement of the core rules of
equity in the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche 
Landesbank v Islington created a test that a proprietary claim in 
constructive trust will only be imposed in circumstances where 
the defendant has knowledge of the factor which is alleged to 
impose the office of trustee on him, thus affecting his 
conscience.
Similarly, a proprietary claim based on resulting trust will only 
obtain where a purported express trust of an equitable interest 
has failed to allocate the whole of that interest, or where an 
equitable interest is created by dint of contribution to the 
purchase price of property. It is submitted that these principles 
restrict the potential intervention of equity to such a narrow 
range of cases that the mutual intentions of parties to 
commercial contracts will frequently not be enforced by either 
the rules of common law or of equity.
EFFECT OF VOID CONTRACTS
The swaps cases concerned two forms of interest rate swap. 
The first was a deep discount swap in which a lump sum was 
paid by the bank to the local authority, as well as the usual 
payment of fixed and floating rate amounts between the parties, 
calculated by reference to a notional amount of money. The 
second was a vanilla interest rate swap, providing for payments 
of fixed and floating amounts of interest, calculated by reference 
to a notional amount of money. Further to the decision of the 
House of Lords in Hazell v Hammersmith &^Fulham [1992] 2 AC 
1, these contracts were held to be ultra vires the local authorities 
and therefore void ab initio.
The issue arose as to the manner in wrhich the banks were 
entitled to seek recovery of sums paid to the local authorities. 
The House of Lords was unanimous in holding that neither the 
lump sum nor any of the interest amounts were to be held on 
resulting trust. Further, it was unanimous in holding that there
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would not be a constructive trust imposed over the money, on 
the basis that the local authorities did not know that the money 
had been advanced to them under a void transaction and 
therefore their consciences had not been affected. At most, 
there was a personal claim in restitution for the amount of
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money transferred under the void agreement, together with 
simple interest. Lord Goff and Lord Woolf dissented on the 
availability of compound interest: the former asserting that it 
ought to have been available on the grounds of justice, the latter 
asserting that commercial people would expect that it would be 
made available.
The impact of the decision is that, even though it was 
accepted that the parties would have expected to receive 
compound interest on their money in ordinary circumstances 
and that they had entered into the standard form contracts, 
parties to financial contracts will not be entitled to proprietary 
remedies where those agreements are held to be void.
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Furthermore, it appears from the decisions that any contractual 
provision which sought to preserve such proprietary rights 
would itself be void, making the retention of title in such 
agreements impossible.
A VARIETY OF EQUITABLE TECHNIQUES
In his article in the Restitution Law Review 1996 at p. 3, 
Professor Birks refers to there being no real difference between 
Lords Goff and Browne-Wilkinson in the interpretation of the 
equitable and restitutionary techniques available in the Islington 
case. Birks is somewhat dismissive of the extent of any changeJ o
that is introduced by Lord Browne-Wilkinson. It is possible, 
however, to see this case as the battleground for three 
generations of lawyers as to how to consider the position of 
equitable proprietary remedies. Their approaches to the 
problem at hand are symptomatic of their generational attitudes. 
In that context, there were no surprises in the decision nor in 
the rationales of the decisions.
There are four established approaches to the issues appealed 
to the House of Lords and considered by the Judicial 
Committee:
(1) The equity lawyers' approach, a modern trusts view, is taken 
up by Lord Browne-Wilkinson and constitutes the majority 
decision against an award of compound interest arguing 
from equitable principle. Contrary to Lord Goff's 
imprecation that the appeal was not the opportunity to 
redraw the availability of many of the claims and remedies 
surrounding equity and restitution, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
decided to do so. As a result, the availability of resulting 
trusts is limited and the doctrine of proprietary interests 
available further to constructive trusts is redrawn.
(2) The conservative restitution approach is set out in the 
speech of Lord Goff in which his dissent from the majority 
is only partial - specifically whether compound interest 
should be made available as a matter of providing justice. 
Lord Goff preserves the approach of the classical restitution 
lawyer in seeking to reverse unjust enrichment caused by the 
receipt of money, further to a contract void ab initio, by 
means of the analysis of existing principle.
(3) The radical restitution approach is typified by the work of 
Professor Birks in seeking to understand the core rationale 
for effecting restitution for unjust enrichment by 
subtraction of that enrichment. Much of this academic 
discussion is considered expressly by their lordships   for 
the most part the radical approach fares badly before the 
House of Lords.
(4) A further approach is drawn out at the end of the discussion, 
to highlight some further issues which would have been
open to the courts on the facts before them, also to draw 
together some common principles from the other 
approaches which would contribute to greater certainty and 
justice in commercial and, specifically, financial situations.
THE ARGUMENT FROM RISK
Financial markets create, manage and exploit risk: frequently 
at the same time. The role of the lawyer in that context is to be 
a risk manager. Legal risk management can be achieved in one of
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two ways. The first is by not entering into the market at all and 
thus avoiding any risk. It is not proposed to spend any more 
time on this aspect. The second is by creating contracts which 
seek to control those risks. Where these contracts are held to be 
void, the ability of the parties to control their risk portfolio is 
effectively removed. In unregulated financial markets, the role of 
commercial and property law is to support prudential and lawful 
attempts to manage risk.
The impact of ineffective standard market contracts is an 
increase in systemic risk. This form of risk was highlighted most 
recently by the collapse of Yamaichi Securities (see Amicus Curiae 
Issue 3, at p. 31). Systemic risk constitutes the risk that, if one 
player in the market goes into insolvency and is unable to meet 
its payment obligation, this will introduce stress into the 
remainder of the market, creating the further risk that more7 o
market users will be forced into a position where they are unable 
to meet their payment obligations because they have not been 
paid by the insolvent party. It is this domino effect which is the 
essence of systemic risk.
RISK OF LOSING LIQUIDITY
Similarly, where market participants are unable to perform, 
the risk posed by financial derivatives is a haemorrhaging of 
liquidity. The notion of liquidity is different from solvency but 
the economic risks are similar. The aim of a treasury function 
within a trading company or bank is to provide liquidity without 
impacting on the solvency of the entity in one way or another. 
Liquidity means matching obligations with ability to pay. 
Derivatives markets aim to add to this pool of liquidity as well as 
to add speculative opportunities. Where payment in full under 
derivatives contracts is precluded by operation of law there is an 
increased level of liquidity risk in the market place.
The market place has sought to introduce some protection 
against this form of total market risk by standardising market 
practices and standardising legal documentation. The work of 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and 
the British Bankers' Association (BBA), among others, has been 
to ensure that termination provisions, payment systems and 
netting provisions are both standardised and legally effective. 
This is the source of the derivatives markets' particular concern 
about the decisions affecting local authorities. At one level, theO '
finding in Hazell that local authorities were not capable of 
entering into interest rate swaps caused concern with reference
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to deals with local authorities. However, the greater disquiet has 
been caused by the manner in which English law has both failed 
to enforce the terms of those standard market contracts, and the 
denial of proprietary remedies to market participants.
EQUITY'S RESPONSE
Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that there could be no retention 
of any rights in the deep discount payment by the bank because 
both parties intended that there be an outright transfer of that 
sum to the authority. The argument for the imposition of a
resulting trust would be that there was no intention to make a 
voluntary and outright transfer of the property in circumstances 
where the contract was found to be void ab initio.
In his 'Restitution and Resulting Trusts' (see Equity and 
Contemporary Legal Problems, edited by S Goldstein, 1992) 
Professor Birks suggests, from a restitutionary stand-point, that 
the role of the resulting trust is primarily restitutionary and that 
this form of resulting trust should be imposed in cases of 
mistaken payment or failure of consideration, to reverse unjust 
enrichment.
At the root of both arguments in favour of the use of the 
resulting trust is the assertion that the most appropriate 
response is to hold that the equitable interest in the property in 
question is to be deemed to have remained with the payer   
whether that assertion is based on equitable or restitutionary 
conceptions of justice. However, it is submitted that these 
suggestions fall into the trap which Lord Browne-Wilkinson has 
identified: any intention to create a resulting trust is to be 
rebutted by the intention at the time of the transfer to make an 
outright transfer. As his lordship held, there is a difficulty with 
establishing the role of the resulting trustee from the moment of 
receipt of the property at a time when there was no knowledge 
of the trusteeship.
EXTENDING CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
The better approach, not addressed expressly by any of the 
courts in Islington, would be to extend the common intention 
constructive trust to commercial situations. Whereas this idea 
has been restricted to family home trusts, it is an idea which 
would appear to sit most comfortably in commercial situations. 
The weakness of the common intention constructive trust, as 
with all rules governing trusts of co-owned domestic land, is 
that it rests on a fiction. The fiction is that there has been some 
agreement between the parties, or some conduct tantamount to 
an agreement, which ought to form an institutional constructive 
trust (that is, one founded on the application of principle rather 
than being a discretionary remedy provided by the court). As a 
result of this fiction, a constructive trust is imposed to set out 
the parties' entitlements to the equitable interest in the land. 
This form of trust is imposed particularly where it is considered 
inequitable not to do so.
In the context of commercial contracts there is an agreement 
between the parties. In seeking to establish the equitable title to 
property passed under a void contract, it is submitted that the 
court ought to consider the common intention, formed between 
the parties, as to the title to that property. Given Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson's determination to recognise the intentions of the 
parties in refuting the possibility of a resulting trust, it would 
appear appropriate to recognise those intentions when 
considering the possibility of a constructive trust. This would 
also appear to address the concerns of Lord Goff and Lord 
Woolf that justice must be seen to be done and that the 
confidence of commercial people in the utility of Lnglish law 
must be promoted.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson rejected the possibility of a 
proprietary interest based on constructive trust on the basis that 
the English model of constructive trust is institutional in nature,
o
operating in response to the trustee's knowledge of some factor 
which ought to impact on his conscience sufficiently to warrant 
the imposition of such a constructive trust. On the facts of 
Islington it was found that the authority did not have knowledge
of the status of the contract until it was declared to be ultra vires 
by the courts.
However, at that point there is another impact on the 
authority's conscience: it had already agreed with the bank that
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it would be bound by the termination provisions in its swap 
agreement (including calculation of interest and netting of 
transactions). It is submitted that this prior agreement ought to 
be sufficient to cause the authority to be bound by those terms 
of the swap contract with regard to the amount owed under the 
agreement. Similarly, such common intention as to termination 
and proprietary rights in assets transferred by arm's length 
market participants should be enforced by equity through the 
common intention constructive trust.
NEW CONTRACTS NEEDED
In the event, the weakness of the market standard contracts 
for over-the-counter derivatives is that they do not cater 
sufficiently for retention of title in property. There is clearly an 
case for ISDA and for the BBA to redraw its standard contracts 
to take account of this deficiency in counterparty protection. 
This is particularly so in the case of physically settled 
transactions and transactions annexed to deep discount 
payments, where title to the specific property transferred is of 
greater importance than receipt of its cash equivalent in a 
designated currency.
The issue which arises is: how can a void contract be given 
effect in part? More specifically, if the swap contract is held to 
have been void ab initio, how can the termination provisions or 
retention of title clauses still be effective? There are two arguments 
on this basis. First, it is clear from Re Goldcorp [1995] AC 74 that, 
if a contract is avoided by election of the parties and property 
transferred under that contract can still be identified, a 
constructive trust will be imposed over that identifiable 
property: Therefore, as a result of Islington, there is a difference 
between the enforceability of a voidable contract and a void 
contract. (It is accepted that in Islington the property was no 
longer identifiable because the bank account into which the 
property' had been paid had subsequently been run overdrawn 
on a number of occasions.)
Secondly, it is submitted that it would be possible to sever the 
termination provisions from the economic provisions of the 
swap contract. This contention proceeds on the basis that the 
latter provisions carry out the interest rate swap which was held 
to be ultra vires the local authority, whereas the termination 
provisions provide only a commercially effective means of 
rescission and contribute to a reduction in systemic risk in the 
financial markets.
THE SEVERANCE OPTION
The classic statement of the doctrine of severance is that:
'where you cannot sever the illegal from the legal part of a covenant, 
the contract is altogether void; but, where you can sever them, whether 
the illegality can be created by statute or by common law, you may 
reject the bad part and retain the good.' (Pickering v Ilfracombe 
Railway (1868) LR 3 CP 235)
The decision of Megarry J in Spector v Ageda [1973] CH 30 
held that the whole of the contract must be considered to be 
void even where a part only of the agreement had been found to 
be illegal by operation of statute. The policy identified in this 
decision was to prevent parties to illegal contracts from putting 
themselves into further harm by enforcing other contracts. 11
Similarly, in £550 Petroleum v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] 
AC 269 it was held that, where covenants in a contract are so 
closely connected that they can be deemed to stand or fall 
together, the whole contract will fail even though some sections 
may appear to be severable.
The risk management features of standard market financial 
documents introduce greater certainty and lessen the cash 
amounts required to be paid between market participants. 
Therefore the identified policy of precluding the parties from 
entering into further damaging transactions does not apply in 
the context of a provision, such as a netting clause on 
termination, which reduces the net amount of the parties' 
exposure to one another. The validity of an instrument need not 
be compromised because some element of it is held to be 
unenforceable (see Gaskell v King (1809) 11 East 165).
The doctrine of severance might also apply with reference to 
the distinction between executed and non-executed 
transactions. It could be submitted that, where the parties have 
acted consensually and without any other unjust factor such as 
fraud or undue influence, there is no injustice in requiring the 
parties to observe their agreement.
There is a further issue as to the efficacy of collateral 'credit 
support agreements' which cannot be considered here due to 
lack of space. However it appears that ISDA's current strategy 
with regard to credit support documentation will not be 
sustainable in the light of the decisions in Islington and Kleinwort 
Bcnson.
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In the Court of Appeal in Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington 
[19941 4 AER 890, Dillon LJ held:
7 do not see why a similar process of severance should not be applied 
where what has happened, in a purely financial matter, is that there has 
been a payment oj money one way and a payment of smaller sums of 
money the other way. The effect of severance is that there has been a 
total failure of consideration in respect oj the balance ofthe money 
which has not come back.'
One important issue arising in this context is why severance 
had not been similarly available with reference to the Sandwell 
litigation, which was initially joined with Islington, where some 
of the contracts had been performed.
The further issue is whether some of the payments made 
between the parties could be treated as settled (thus supporting 
a mutual debts analysis) or whether they are to be required as 
part of a single (executory) contract which had not been fully 
performed until the final payment had been made. This topic 
was discussed in my earlier article in the November 1997 issue 
of Amicus Curiae (Issue 2, at p. 27).
CONCLUSION
In considering commercial situations, the appropriate rules of 
equity should either allow for an equitable proprietary remedy 
to be available to a party where the contractual agreement has 
allocated title to the property' transferred under the transaction, 
or allow an equitable proprietary remedy according with the 
common intention of the parties as set out in an agreement 
between them. It is similarly arguable that such a remedy ought 
to be available where there was some undue influence in the 
creation of the financial product, or where either party was 
caused to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the other party, 
or where rescission is the appropriate remedy under a physically 
settled transaction.
It is suggested that the usual defences of change of position 
and passing on would still obtain. Similarly public policy would 
constitute an exception in such circumstances.
A remedy by means of equitable compensation or by 
imposition of personal liability under constructive trust should 
be made available in cases of:
(1) reckless risk-taking;
(2) where the product was unsuitable;
(3) if rescission is the appropriate remedy under a cash-settled 
transaction;
(4) if the risk taken, or the context in which the risk was taken, 
contravened some principle of public policy or of statute or 
of some other mandatory rule of law or equity.
What is not supportable is the dismay in the commercial 
community outside the UK which relies on English law. Lord 
Woolf referred to the need for a modern test in financial 
transactions based on foreseeability of loss. As Lord Brovvne- 
Wilkinson found in Target Holdings [ 1996] 1 AC 421, there is a 
need to break from the application of traditional rules to 
commercial situations and consider the commercial context for 
equity:
In Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, Lord Nicholls 
accepted the need to recognise inappropriate risk-taking by a 
fiduciary as a ground for a claim in equity'. In the context of 
financial contracts, equity' must accept the need to account for 
risk and suitability of product. As a corollary to this, it must 
enforce the common intention of the parties as to the 
termination of financial contracts. ©
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